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ABSTRACT

Maintenance analysis focuses on the
maintenance program for both flight el CM
and ground support hardware. Personnel
productivity could actually be considered a
subject of processing analysis. After all,
the prime components of the ground
processing cycle are the flight hardware
elements, ground support facilities and
equipment, the processing and maintenance
program, spare parts and material , and
people. We have emphasized personnel
productivity because it is involved in all
segments of the processing cycle and is
potentially the easiest area to realize
improvements. It doesn't cost a lot of
money as do increases in spares, new
facilities and more reliable flight
hardware. It only requires an awareness of
non-productive time and a management
discipline to correct the conditions causing
the non-productivity.

Technical progress in the evolution of a
transportation system, is marked by various
stages. Namely, concept, design and
development, test and verification, and
operations. The airline industry has been
successfully transitionirg high technology
equipment through these phase? both safely
and economically. The technique? which they
employ are being effectively applied to the
Space Shuttle Program, as it enters the
operational era.
INTRODUCTION
Pan Arn is working with the Lockheed Space
Operations Company and fvjASA to inject airline
techniques ana procedures into the shuttle
turnaround processing operations at both KSC
and VLS. We are currently involved in three
primary areas - process planning and control,
logistics and operations analysis. It is
within this latter erca that we have our
largest challenge and broadest area of
operation. Our task is to identify changes
in the processing system which will allow
higher launch rates, reduce operating costs
and maintain the safety record established by
earlier launches. Solutions to this task are
obviously varied and complex. However, we
are confident that progress can be made by
the application of airline operations and
maintenance techniques to shuttle processing.

The prime topic for this paper is Pan Arc's
approach to maintenance analysis for the
shuttle program. We are applying airline
industry maintenance program techniques tc
both flight element and ground support
hardware. These are based upon our
experience with and confidence in the
maintenance programs derived through the
Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) established
by the airline industry.
The airline n^intenance concept (MSG-3)
analyzes from the consequence of failure
standpoint. It establishes an initial
maintenance program made up of tasks that
are both applicable and effective, while
recognizing key safety factors. It also
provides for the modification of the initial
program through the analysis of operating
data. This results in a viable maintenance
program over- the life of the vehicle. It
assures that only those tasks which prevent

Our operations analysis efforts are focused
in three general areas - processing analysis,
maintenance analysis, and personnel
productivity. Processing analysis is
concerned with the end-to-enc review cf the
entire ground processing cycle to identify
constraints to launch, rate increases,
processing deficiencies and cost anomalies.
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was being made in aircraft design. The
designers recognized that certain failures
could not be effectively prevented or
reduced. Therefore, designs incorporated
failure-tolerance or redundancy.

deterioration of inherent reliability and
safety are scheduled during the processing
cycle.
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM EVOLUTION

Failure-tolerance significantly altered the
relationship between reliability and safety.

In the early phases of aviation, maintenance
programs were developed by a few experienced
mechanics. They looked at the airplane, they
talked to the manufacturer and they decided
what should be done. Also, the maintenance
activity was based on the cause and effect
relationship of the equipment. Thus,
traditional maintenance concepts evolved
based on this type of experience.

The reliability of an aircraft is a function
of the discrete reliability of its parts
which depend on their inherent design
qualities. Operating safety is also a
function of the inherent design
characteristics. The dependence of both
reliability and safety upon the inherent
design characteristics leads to the
conclusion that safety and reliability are
necessarily related. This is not so.
Another factor controls this relationship,
i.e., the ability of the design to retain
its essential functions even though failures
have occurred.

Early aircraft had very little tolerance for
failure. Generally, all parts had to
function properly. Many of the early
accidents and fatalities were the result of
mechanical failures.
The lessons that were learned from these
early experiences were:

Thus, where in the early phases of aviation,
reliability was directly related to safety,
now redundancy or failure-tolerance enhances
safety by assuring that system or hardware
failures do not degrade operating safety.

Mechanical parts wear out.
Wearouts cause failures.
Failures affect safety.
This then became the doctrine of preventive
maintenance. It was logical. It was based
on experience. It became a tradition.

Relationship Between Age and Reliability
The rationale for periodic maintenance is to
restore resistance to failure prior to the
failure occurring. This implies some
predictability and an effective task.

Traditional Concept
Another way of viewing this traditional cause
and effect relationship, as it applies to
maintenance programs, is:

However, the time honored belief or perhaps
intuitive concept that reliability is
directly related to overhaul intervals
cannot be confirmed on complex units. For
many items, contrary to expectations,
likelihood of failure did not increase with
increasing time. The failure rates were
constant or independent of time. Hundreds
of analyses showed that there is no optimum
time for overhaul for many complex units.
Consequently, maintenance policy based
exclusively on operating age has little or
no effect on failure rate. As a matter of
fact, in many cases, there was an increase
in failures due to maintenance induced
actions.

Reliability and safety are directly
related
or
failures of parts or components have a
direct affect on operating safety.
Reliability degrades with increase in
age
or
there is a finite unairworthy age for
each part.
This traditional concept results in the
conclusion that the more frequently equipment
was overhauled, the more it was protected
from failure.
Thus, in the
make-it-work
emphasis was
wearing out.
intuitively,
worked quite

By the late 1950's and early 1960's, there
was sufficient data and maintenance costs
were sufficiently high to question the
effectiveness of preventive maintenance
vis-a-vis reliability. At the same time,
the FAA was frustrated by experience showing
that changes in overhaul content or
frequency did not produce changes in the
failure rates of certain engines.

early phases of aviation, or the
phase, most of the maintenance
placed on keeping parts from
Programs were developed
and for the most part, they
wel1.

Relationship Between Reliability and Safety
For many years, these maintenance concepts
remained static, while considerable progress
4-20

achievement has been the validation and
realization of the benefits of the program
developed using MSG-1/2 techniques.

This lead to the establishment of
FAA/Industry reliability programs in the
early 1960's. The objective of the
reliability programs was to control
reliability through an analysis of factors
that affect reliability and provide a system
of actions to improve reliability. This
approach was a direct challenge to the
traditional concepts that length of time
between overhauls controls failure rates.

MSG-1 was developed for the B747 and the
programs implemented were the result of the
application of the MSG-1 logic. MSG-1 was
revised and updated and then was adopted as
MSG-2 for the subsequent DC-10 and L1011
wide body aircraft. The Europeans, working
concurrently, adopted some of the same
principles and developed EMSG-2 and used it
on the Concorde.

The conclusion of this activity led to the
recognition that:

The wide body aircraft were the first to
exclusively use the MSG-1/2 techniques for
their maintenance program development. The
resulting programs achieved reliability
levels equal to, or better than, those of
previous jets, while holding the line on
maintenance costs.

Overhaul has little effect on
reliability of complex units.
Preventative maintenance has no effect
on the reliability of certain parts.
Experience with MSG 1/2
The culmination of these activities was the
development of MSG-1 and MSG-2 (Maintenance
Steering Group) decision-diagram logic. The
MSG process ties together safety and
economics and the effectiveness of action.

Development of MSG-3
Like any other activity, once you have an
opportunity to gain experience and see how
something works, the process to improve it
begins. With MSG-2 now ten years old, we
could see where improvement should be made.
The revision to MSG-2 was initiated and
MSG-3 evolved.

Until the MSG process, maintenance was a
craft acquired mostly through experience and
rarely examined analytically. The
significance of MSG-1/2 is that it introduced
engineering discipline into the maintenance
program development. It quantified the
judgement previously used. It recognized and
documented what aircraft had been telling us
for years and took into account the inherent
design safety of the aircraft and equipment.

There are a number of differences between
MSG-2 and MSG-3. However, MSG-3 does not
constitute a fundamental departure from the
previous version, it is built upon the
existing framework of MSG-2 which has been
validated by years of reliable aircraft
operation using maintenance programs based
thereon.

MSG-1/2 developed a logic which categorized
safety and economics and provided an orderly
and disciplined process to:

MSG-3 has adjusted the decision logic flow
paths ±o provide a more rational procedure
for task definition and a more
straightforward and linear progression
through the decision logic.

Identify all the important elements of
the aircraft.
Analyze their failure mode and effect.
Develop systems to control these.

MSG-3 logic takes a "from the top
consequence of failure approach.
outset, the functional failure is
for consequence of failure and is
one of two basic categories:

These procedures provide a systematic review
of the aircraft design so that in the absence
of real experience, the best maintenance
process could be utilized for each component
and system. In all of this effort, however,
good technical judgement was still a
prerequisite.

down" or
At the
assessed
assigned

Safety
Economics

The high expectation for the wide body
aircraft in the late 1960's have been
confirmed by the experience of the 1970's.
First, the B747 and subsequently, the DC-10
and L1011 have achieved the highest levels of
safety and comfort. From a maintenance
program standpoint, the most significant

Further classification determines
sub-categories based on whether the failure
is evident to or hidden from the operating
crew. (For Structures, category designation
is "significant" or "other" structure, and
all functional failures are considered
safety consequence items).
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The structures decision logic no longer
contains a specific numerical rating system.
The responsibility for developing rating
systems has been assigned to the individual
maintenance program review teams.

With the consequence category established,
only those task selection questions pertinent
to the category need be asked. This
eliminates unnecessary assessments and
expedites the analysis. A definite
applicability and effectiveness criteria has
been developed to provide a more vigorous
selection of tasks. In addition, this
approach helps to eliminate items from the
analytical procedure whose failures have no
significant consequence.

EFFICIENT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
The prime purpose of MSG-3 is to assist in
the development of an initial scheduled
maintenance program for new types of
aircraft and/or powerplants. The purpose of
the program developed is to maintain the
inherent safety and reliability levels of
equipment.

Task selection questions are arranged in a
sequence such that the most preferred task,
most easily accomplished, is considered
first. In the absence of a positive
indication concerning the applicability and
effectiveness of a task, the next task in
sequence must be considered, down to and
including possible redesign.

It is desirable, therefore, to define the
objectives and the content of an efficient
maintenance program and the method by which
the program can be developed.
The objectives of an efficient airline
maintenance program are:

Structures logic has evolved into a form
which more directly assesses the possibility
of structural deterioration processes.
Considerations of fatigue, corrosion,
accidental damage, age exploration programs
and others, are incorporated into the logic
diagram and are routinely considered.

To ensure realization of the inherent
safety and reliability levels of
equipment.
To restore safety and reliability to
their inherent levels when
deterioration has occurred.
To obtain the information necessary for
design improvement of those items whose
inherent reliability proves inadequate.
To accomplish these goals at minimum
total cost, including maintenance costs
and the costs of residual failures.

MSG-3 recognizes the new damage tolerance
rules of the Federal Aviation Regulations and
the supplemental inspection programs.
Concepts such as multiple failures, effect of
failure on adjacent structure, crack growth
from detectable to critical length, and
threshold exploration for potential failure,
are also covered.

These objectives recognize that maintenance
programs, as such, cannot correct
deficiencies in the inherent safety and
reliability levels of the equipment. The
maintenance program can only prevent
deterioration of such inherent levels. If
the inherent levels are found to be
unsatisfactory, design modification is
necessary to obtain improvement.

MSG-3 logic is task-oriented and not
maintenance process oriented (MSG-2). This
eliminates the confusion associated with the
various interpretations of Condition
Monitoring (CM), On-Condition (OC), Hard Time
(HT) and the difficulties encountered when
attempting to determine what maintenance was
being accomplished to an item that carried
one of the process labels.

The content of the maintenance program
itself consists of two groups of tasks:

Servicing/Lubrication is included to ensure
that important task is considered each time
an item is analyzed.

1)

Treatment of hidden functional failures is
more thorough than that of MSG-2.
The effect of concurrent or multiple failure
is considered. Sequential failure concepts
are used as part of the hidden functional
failure assessment (Systems, Powerplant) and
multiple failure is considered in structural
evaluation.

A group of scheduled tasks to be
accomplished at specified intervals.
The objective of these tasks is to
prevent deterioration of the inherent
safety and reliability levels of the
equipment. The tasks in a scheduled
maintenance program may include:
Lubrication/Servicing
Operating Crew Monitoring
Operational Check
Inspection/Functional Check
Restoration
Discard
Combinations of the above

There is a clear separation between tasks
that are economically desirable and those
that are required for safe operation.
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2)

A group of non-scheduled tasks which
result from:
The scheduled tasks accomplished at
other than the specified intervals.
Reports of malfunctions (usually
originated by the operating and
maintenance crews).
Data analysis.

The objective of these non-scheduled tasks is
to restore the equipment to an acceptable
condition.

The process begins at the operating crew
level by asking the question:
IS THE OCCURRENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL
FAILURE EVIDENT TO THE OPERATING CREW
DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF NORMAL
DUTIES?

This question is asked for each functional
failure. It is intended to segregate the
evident and hidden failures from the
operating crew perspective.
A hidden function is defined as one which:

An efficient program is one which schedules
only those tasks necessary to meet the stated
objectives. It does not schedule additional
tasks which will increase maintenance costs
without a corresponding increase in
reliability protection.

Is normally active and whose cessation
will not be evident to the operating
crew during their performance of normal
duties.
Is normally inactive and whose
readiness to perform prior to it being
needed, will not be evident to the
operating crew during performance of
their normal duties.

MSG-3 describes the method for developing the
scheduled maintenance program. Non-scheduled
maintenance results from scheduled tasks,
normal operation or data analysis.

A "YES 11 answer leads to the following
question:

MSG-3 System/Powerplant Analysis Method
The first essential element is to identify
all the Maintenance Significant Items (MSI).

DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR
SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A DIRECT
ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY?

Selection of an MSI begins at the highest
manageable level, i.e., system, subsystem,
component or part. MSI's are identified as
those whose failure:

In order to answer this question, the
following definitions are in order:

Could affect safety (on ground or in
flight) and/or
Is detectable during operations, and/or
Could have significant operational
economic impact, and/or
Could have significant non-operational
economic impact.

Direct - a direct functional failure
achieves its effect by Itself and not
in combination with other functional
failures.
Adverse Effect on Safety - consequence
of failure are extremely serious, may
cause loss of vehicle and/or injury to
occupants.

Once identified, then each MSI.must have
documented, its:

Operating - this is the interval of
time from the moment the vehicle is
operating under its own power to the
moment it comes to rest at the next
point of landing.

Function - the normal characteristic
actions of the item.
Functional failure - how an items fails
to perform its function.
Failure effect - what is the result of
functional failure.
Failure cause - why failure occurs.

A "YES" answer leads to the safety effects
category for task determination. A "YES"
answer requires that there be an applicable
and effective task or the part must be
redesigned.

For each significant item, an analysis of the
functional failures, failure causes and the
applicability and effectiveness of the tasks
must be carried out. Each functional failure
will be processed through the logic into one
of the five"consequence of failure
categories.

A "NO" answer indicates an economic effect
and these tasks are developed based on the
functional failure effect on the capability
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of the aircraft to perform its operating
mission requirement.

Each of these categories contains a task
definition logic which must be completed to
develop an applicable and effective task.

This is taken into account by asking:

Task development is handled in a similar
manner for each of the five effect
categories. For task determination, it is
necessary to apply the failure causes for
the functional failure to the second level
of the logic. There are seven possible task
resultant questions in the Effect
categories. See Figure 1.

DOES THE FUNCTIONAL FAILURE HAVE A
DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT ON OPERATING
CAPABILITY?

The question reviews consequence of failure
which:
Would require correction prior to
dispatch.
Would compromise the mission flexibility
by imposing operating restrictions.

The MSG-3 method for conducting structural
item analysis is quite extensive and
therefore, only a brief outline of the
process will be discussed here.

This question is asked of each evident,
non-safety functional failure. The task
selection process then goes down the
appropriate paths based on a "YES" or "NO 11
response.

The process is designed to relate the
scheduled maintenance program to
consequences of structural item functional
failure. The structures susceptability to
damage and the degree of difficulty involved
in detecting such damage. Once this is
established, the effectiveness of several
levels of inspections and accomplishment are
evaluated and the results compared.
Finally, based on the most effective
combination, a structural maintenance
program is determined.

The process described so far covers evident
functional failures. However, had the answer
to the initial question been "NO", indicating
that the functional failure was not evident
to the operating crew, then one further
question is required before the determination
of the consequence of failure is completed.
The question which must be asked in this
case:

The important elements of the process are:
Identify items as Structural
Significant Items (SSI) or Other
Structure.
A Structural Significant Item (SSI) is
a structural detail, a structural
element, or a structural assembly,
which is judged significant because of
the reduction in aircraft residual
strength or loss of structural function
which are consequences of its failure.
Other Structure is that which is judged
not to be a Structural Significant
Item. It is defined both externally
and internally within zonal boundaries.
Classify SSI's as damage tolerant of
safe-life structure.
An item is judged to be damage tolerant
if it can sustain damage and the
remaining structure can withstand
reasonable loads without structural
failure or excessive structural
deformation until the damage is
detected.
Safe-life Structure is structure which
is not practical to design or qualify
as damage tolerant:

DOES THE COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE ADDITIONAL
FAILURE OF A SYSTEM RELATED OR BACK-UP
FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON
OPERATING SAFETY?
Again, this question is asked for each hidden
functional failure. It takes into account
failures in which the loss of one hidden
function alone, i.e., a failure unknown to
operating crews does not affect safety;
however, in combination with an additional
functional failure, has a adverse effect on
operating safety.
Depending on either a "YES" or "NO" answer,
tasks are developed for safety or economic
considerations.
The MSG-3 process described to this point
covers the consequence of failure category.
Based on the logic path followed, each
functional failure will fall into one of the
following effect categories:
Safety
Operational (economic)
Non-Operational (economic)
Hidden, Safety
Hidden, Non-Safety (economic)

Its reliability is protected by discard
limits which remove items from service
before failures are expected.
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For each damage tolerant SSI, rate separately
ir.s susceptibility to each of the three
deterioration processes:

SMSG reveals a valid reed to add some
tasks for detection of failure of
hidden functions.
SMSG performs a valuable systematic
audit function.
Assures "important requirements are not
overlooked, deleted.
Assures current requirements are
justified (not excessive).
Provides a data base for evaluating
future proposed changes.

Fatigue
Lnvi ronmental deterioration
Accidental damage
Select for each damage tolerant SSI the
following inspection features:
Level and method of inspection
Inspection of threshold
Frequency of inspection (repeat
interval;
Fleet leader/age exploration program, if
applicable

SMSG structural analysis will provide a
comprehensive, cost effective structural
inspection requirements plan.
An extension of the project into 1984/85 has
been made to apply SMSG-1 analysis to the
remainder of the orbiter systems and developthe structural inspection requirements for
the entire Orbiter.

For each safe-life SSI, rate separately its
susceptibility to the two deterioration
processes:
Environmental
Accidental Damage

APPLICATION OF MSG-3 TO SHUTTLE GSL (Fig. 2)

The great quantity of ground support
equipment at KSC, its complexity and the
enormous number of man hours spent
maintaining it prompted the question - Can
application of MSG-3 concepts to the GSE
produce efficient maintenance programs,
while retaining the inherent safety and
reliability of the equipment?

Select for each safe-life SSI the following
inspection features:
Level and method of inspection
Threshold of initial inspection (if
appropriate)
Frequency of inspection (repeat

The Pan Am team at KSC, under SPC, initiated
a project to develop an adaptation of MSG-3
for GSE. The acronym, 'SEMSG-1 1 was
selected for identification and stands for,
"Support Equipment Maintenance Steering
Group", First issue. The SEMSG-1 User's
Guide was developed to supplement the MSG-3
document in producing the GSE maintenance
programs.

Overlay the inspection requirements for each
SSI according to the deterioration processes
for which it was rated. Consolidate tasks
and document the results.
For Other Structure, establish appropriate
maintenance tasks based on:
Past experience, arid/or

The first piece of GSE selected for
application of the SEMSG-1 concepts was a
new mobile aerial work platform (cherry
picker) with a 170 foot vertical reach, the
Condor 170.

Manufacturer's recommendation for new
materials and/or concepts.
APPLICATION OF MSG-3 TO SHUTTLE
A project was initiated in 1982 by Pan Am,
under contract to Rockwell International at
Downey, California, to develop a Shuttle
Maintenance Steering Group - 1 (SMSG-1)
system for application to Space Shuttle,
based on the MSG-3 analytical system. During
fiscal year '83, the SMSG-1 was developed and
applied to three orbiter systems and the aft
fuselage structure. The resulting
maintenance tasks were compared with the
existing maintenance requirements (OMRSD)
with the following conclusions:

The analysis is complete ana an example is
attached as Appendix I. The complete
maintenance program is still under
development. However, the sample indicates
the program will be successful in meeting
its goals.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
The Space Shuttle maintenance program is
presently made up of the following elements:
The Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Documents (OMRSD) are the
basis of the Shuttle routine maintenance
programs. The requirements were established

Existing OMRSD requirements are not
excessive.
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enable those needing the data to retrieve it
in a logical, usable manner. The data is
then analyzed to determine what it can tell
us, if we ask the right questions:

during Shuttle development by the
manufacturers of the Orbiter, ET and SRB's in
conjunction with and approval of NASA. Now
that the Shuttle is operational, these
requirements need constant review to keep the
maintenance program viable and effective and
to reduce costs while ensuring the desired
level of safety is maintained (See Figure 3).

Do we have a problem affecting safety?
What is the economic impact?
Are we exceeding our economic
projections?.
Will we be exposed to possible launch
delays?
Is the maintenance program adequate?

The Operational Maintenance Instructions
(OMI's), also part of the routing maintenance
program, translate the OMRSD into a working
document which provides the step by step
procedures for doing the tasks required on
the Shuttle elements. It also sets the
material and ground support equipment
requirements. The OMI's need review to
insure the OMRSD requirements are not
exceeded and that the tasks are performed In
a safe and efficient manner (See Figure 4),
The OMI system will be replaced by a Job Card
system to streamline the control, handling
and accomplishment of the tasks.

A good information feedback system can
provide the answers for these questions and
many more.
Therefore, we propose to review the present
data gathering, cataloging, retrieval and
analysis systems to determine their adequacy
in supporting the maintenance process.

The non-routine part of the maintenance
program originates from flight anomalies
(Figure 5} and inspection/test generated
discrepancy items (Figure 6). This is the
part of the maintenance program that restores
the safety and reliability to their inherent
levels when deterioration has occurred. It
also is telling us something very important,
if we are listening. It is like going to a
doctor when you don't feel "up to par". He
examines you, runs various tests, X-rays,
etc., analyzes your symptoms and results of
the tests, than gives you some medication or
puts you in the hospital to correct your
immediate problems. To complete the process,
he then advises you what changes you must
make in your lifestyle to keep these problems
from recurring. The same is true of our
Shuttle maintenance programs. We must
analyze the anomalies and problem reports to
determine if routine programs are keeping our
Shuttle healthy, safe and efficient.
MAINTENANCE INFORMATION FEEDBACK SYSTEMS

The maintenance process, to remain dynamic
and efficient, must have an effective
monitoring system. This is provided in the
airlines through Maintenance Information
Feedback Systems. These systems are
developed from the user standpoint, thus,
assuring an effective program.
The first phase of the program is to
determine what data needs to be retained to
provide a measure of the various aspects of
performance. The data sources can be
component unscheduled removals, systems test
discrepancies, flight anomalies, inspection
findings, launch delays, etc.. Once
collected, the data must be cataloged to
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EFFECT CATEGORIES

EVINON-ODPEENTRATIONAL
OEVIPERDATENTIONAL
DENT
EVISAFETY

NHIOND-SDENAFETY
(ECONOMIC)

(ECONOMIC)

HIDDEN
SAFETY

(ECONOMIC)

TASK QUESTIONS
•

•

•

•

•

•

*

*

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

*

*

•

•

B(1). IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF
FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

it

it

•

*

*

•

•

A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK APPLICABLE
AND EFFECTIVE?

*

• .

B(2). ISCHECKTOVERIFYOPERATION APPLICABLE
AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE FINDING TASK).
C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION OF
FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT TASK(S)
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE FAILURE
RATE APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES OR
REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?
F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION OF TASKS
WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

*USE ONLY IF ANSWER TO PREVIOUS QUESTION IS "NO".
FOR "YES" ANSWER, DESCRIBE TASK. FOR "NO" ANSWER, STATE WHY.

Figure 1
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YES/NO

MSG-3 APPLICATION TO STS GSE
• FIRST YEAR — FY 1984
• USING MSG-3 ANALYTICAL SYSTEM AS A BASIS, DEVELOP
SEMSG-1 SYSTEM FOR APPLICATION TO SPACE SHUTTLE
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
• APPLY SEMSG-1 ANALYSIS TO SELECTED GSE:
• SHUTTLE NON-FLIGHT HARDWARE GSE
• GROUND FACILITIES
• SHUTTLE FLIGHT HARDWARE GSE

• COMPARE SEMSG-1 RESULTING MAINTENANCE TASKS
WITH EXISTING REQUIREMENTS
• EVALUATE RESULTS OF ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
• REVISE REQUIREMENTS TO ADD, DELETE OR CHANGE
MAINTENANCE TASKS AS SUBSTANTIATED BY SEMSG-1
ANALYSIS

• SECOND YEAR - FY 1985 AND CONTINUING
• APPLY SEMSG-1 ANALYSIS TO REMAINDER OF SHUTTLE
GSE
• COMPARE SEMSG-1 RESULTING MAINTENANCE TASKS
WITH EXISTING REQUIREMENTS
• ESTABLISH MAINTENANCE INFORMATION SYSTEM TO
MONITOR GSE MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS

Figure 2
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OMRSD

BASIC ROUTINE
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
OPERATIONAL AND FUNTIONAL TESTS
SERVICING ITEMS
COMPONENT REPLACEMENTS
STRUCTURAL INSPECTION PROGRAM
SYSTEMS INSPECTION PROGRAM

THESE WILL BE REVIEWED TO:
1. RE-ESTABLISH THE NEED FOR THEIR EXISTANCE
2. RE-ESTABLISH THE FREQUENCY REQUIREMENTS
3. INVESTIGATE FOR REDUCTION IN TASK LEVEL AND
SCOPE

Figure 3
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OMI'S

(WORK ITEMS)

SET THE MATERIAL
AND GROUND SUPPORT
REQUIREMENTS TO
ACCOMPLISH THE OMRSD'S
AND PROVIDE
THE STEP BY STEP
PROCEDURES FOR ACCOMPLISHING
THE ACTUAL WORK
THESE WILL BE REVIEWED TO:

1. VERIFY WORK CONTENT COMPLIES WITH AND DOES
NOT EXCEED OMRSD REQUIREMENTS
2. SIMPLIFY WORK PROCEDURES
3. GAIN INFORMATION REGARDING GROUND SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND INTERFACES.

Figure 4
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FLIGHT
ANOMALIES
(FLIGHT LOG ITEMS OR
IN-FLIGHT DISCREPANCIES)

PART OF NON-ROUTINE
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
COMPONENT FAILURES
SYSTEM MAL FUNCTIONS
THESE WILL BE REVIEWED TO:
1. DETERMINE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FAILURE
AND ITS EFFECT ON SAFETY AND/OR ECONOMIC
IMPACT.
2. DETERMINED ADEQUACY OF MAINTENANCE
PROGRAM.

Figure 5

INSPECTION/TEST
GENERATED
DISCREPANCY
ITEMS
THESE ARE NON-ROUTINE ITEMS
RESULTING FROM STRUCTURAL AND
SYSTEMS ROUTINE INSPECTIONS.
ALSO, ARE ANOMALIES FOUND DURING
SYSTEMS TESTS AND CHECKOUTS.

WE WILL REVIEW THESE FOR:
1. STRUCTURAL OR SYSTEMS DEFECTS/ANOMALIES
WHICH WILL DICTATE A MORE RESTRICTIVE
INSPECTION/MAINTENANCE PROGRAM.
2. ABSENCE OF DEFECTS/ANOMALIES WHICH WILL
DICTATE A MORE LIBERAL INSPECTION/MAINTENANCE
PROGRAM.

Figure 6
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AIRLINE MAINTENANCE
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
TYPICAL AIRLINE DATA REPORTS
• AIRCRAFT SYSTEM PROBLEM ALERTS
• FLIGHT DEPARTURE DELAYS
• FLIGHT CANCELLATIONS
• COMPONENT REMOVAL/FAILURE RATES
• COMPONENT FAILURE ANALYSIS
• BY SERIAL NO.
• BY AIRCRAFT
« BY FAILURE TYPE

• INSPECTION FINDINGS
• BY AIRCRAFT ZONE FOR STRUCTURES
• BY ATA CHAPTER FOR SYSTEMS

RESULTING ACTIONS
• REVISE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
• ADD ITEMS (TEST OR INSPECTION)
• REVISE SCOPE OF WORK
• REVISE FREQUENCY OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

• REVISE MAINTENANCE OR OPERATIONS MANUALS
• MODIFY AIRCRAFT AND/OR COMPONENTS
• REVISE SPARES REQUIREMENTS

Figure 7
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AIRLINE ENHANCEMENTS FOR
SHUTTLE GROUND TURNAROUND

APPENDIX

_I

TYPICAL
SEMSG-1 ANALYSIS

CALAVAR

CONDOR MODEL 170

SYSTEM
HYDRAULIC

SUB-SYSTEM
STABILIZATION

4-34

SYSTEM BREAKDOWN AND FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

56-10-20

ITEM

HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION

SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM
SYSTEM BREAKDOWN AND FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION:

58-10-00
HYDRAULICS

58-10-10
POWER & DISTRIBUTION

58-10-20
STABILIZATION

58-10-30
AERIAL CONTROLS

— Jack/outrigger hydraulic cylinders ( 6 )
— Check valves

CO
CJI

— Counterbalance valve
^-Aft outrigger lock assy
— Sequence valves
—Solenoid control valves

Form Fl

Feb. 13/84

Prepared by:

Date:

SYSTEM BREAKDOWN AND FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

58-10-20

ITEM

HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION

SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM

SYSTEM BREAKDOWN AND FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION:

The vehicle platform is leveled and stabilized by four hydraulic cylinders. Two forward jacks are mounted in the
end of the front bunper frame. The two aft jacks are mounted on outriggers and are spread horizontally outward
from the vehicle frame by the outrigger hydraulic cylinder.
Leveling and stabilization of the vehicle platform must be acconplished prior to using the aerial lift functions.
Limit switches mounted on each jack and wired in parallel lock out all other functions until each jack is firmly
positioned and loaded.
During the jacking process, hydraulic fluid is directed to the extend side of .the actuators by the solenoid operated
control valve. A sequence valve causes the outrigger lock cylinder to retract, unlocking the outrigger assembly.
Fluid is then directed to the extend side of the outrigger cylinder. A second sequence valve prevents extension
of the vertical jack cylinder until the outriggers are fully extended in the horizontal direction.
When the vehicle is fully leveled and stabilized, hydraulic fluid is "locked in" the jack cylinder by check valves
in both the extend and retract lines. Thermal expansion of the "locked in" fluid could move the cylinder piston
and unlevel the platform. To prevent this, a counterbalance valve is installed between the extend and return lines
to allow equalization of the pressures in the cylinder.

Form Fl

Feb. 13/84

Prepared by:

Date:

FUNCTIONS/FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

58-10-20

ITEM

HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION

SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM
FUNCTION(S)

FUNCTIONAL FAILURE(S)

1. Jack up & level vehicle
platform.

FAILURE EFFECT(S)
(Only one effect per failure)

(Identify each by no.)

1. Fails to jack up & level
vehicle bed.

1. Loss of vehicle use.

FAILURE CAUSE(S)

(Identify each by no. and
letter
l.A Solenoid operated control
valve(s) inoperat ive.
l.B Aft outrigger locking
cylinder inoperative.
l.C Aft outrigger sequence
valve fails open.
l.D Outrigger extension
binding.
l.E Counterbalance valve
failed open.

2. Maintain stable vehicle
platform under all load
conditons & directions.

2. Fails to maintain stable
vehicle platform under all
load conditions &
directions.

2. Possible vehicle upset
with personnel injuries.

2.A One or more jack cylinders
bypassing or leaking.
2.B One or more check valves
leaking.
2.C Counterbalance valve
fails open.

Form F2

Feb . 13/84
Prepared by:

Dates

FAILURE EFFECT CATEGORY

ITEM:

HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION

FAILURE:

FAILURE EFFECT CATEGORY

YES

QUESTION NO. (Answer and explain)

YES

1.

NO

DOES FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR
SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING
FROM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
HAVE DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT
ON OPERATING SAFETY?

DOES COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE
ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF A
SYSTEM RELATED OR BACKUP
FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE
EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY?

Yes - Operator has to visually monitor
each jack position to properly
level and stabilize vehicle
platform.

)/3. No - Aerial platform would still be
in a stowed position.

NO
DOES FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
HAVE DIRECT ADVERSE
EFFECT ON OPERATING
CAPABILITY?

4- Yes - Aerial controls cannot be
operated until vehicle level
& stabilized. Use of vehicle
is lost until discrepancy corrected
YES

2

EVIDENT
NON-OPERATIONAL
ECONOMIC

Form F3

58-10-20

Loss of vehicle use.

FUNCTION: 1.
FAILURE: 1.

1 IS OCCURRENCE OF FUNCTIONAL FAILURE EVIDENT TO
OPERATION PERSONNEL DURING NORMAL DUTIES OR TO
LAUNCH CONTROL VIA SYSTEM MONITORING?

CO
00

IDENTIFICATION NO.

Fails to jack up and level vehicle platform.

FAILURE EFFECT:

Feb. 13/84

8
HIDDEN
SAFETY

NO

2

CATEGORY: 6, Evident Operational Economic

HIDDEN
ECONOMIC

Prepared by:

Date:

SELECTED TASKS /FREQUENCY DETERMINATION

IDENTIFICATION NO.

HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATAION

ITEM:

QUESTION

EFFECT CATEGORY
5 (£ i 7

8

9

o

o

0

o

0

o

o

o

*

*

o

o

o

*

*

o

o

0

it

*

0

0

o

o

0

o

o

o

o

o

o

0

it

*

*

0

58-10-20

1A< SOLENOID OPERATED CONTROL VALVE INOPERATIVE

FAILURE CAUSE:

YES/NO

DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)

A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

No consumables to replenish.

B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.

C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.

D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

E. . IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES NO
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE
FINDING TASK) .

F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO".

Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.

SELECTED
TASK

FREQUENCY:

None

None
REDESIGN:

Q MANDATORY

Q DESIRABLE

Q NOT REQUIRED

SELECTED TASKS /FREQUENCY DETERMINATION

IDEWTIFICATION NO.

HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION

ITEM:

FAILURE CAUSE:
EFFECT CATEGORY

5<S) 7

8

9

o

0

o

o

o

o

0

o

0

o
*

*

o

*
o

o

o

0

o

* *
o o

o

0

it

*

0

0

0

0

0

o

*

*

o

in on

DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)

QUESTION

YES/NO

A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

YES

Lubricate mechanical portion of lock.

B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

Reduced resistance to hydraulic failure is not
detectable nor is rate of resistance to failure
predictable .

C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

Reduced resistance to hydraulic failure is not
detectable nor is rate of resistance to failure
predictable.

D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE
FINDING TASK).

F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO" .
SELECTED
TASK

co

1B. AFT OUTRIGGER LOCKING CYLINDER INOPERATIVE

Lubricate mechanical portion of
aft outrigger locking cylinder.

Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.
FREQUENCY:

REDESIGN:

Every six months.

Q MANDATORY

Q DESIRABLE

0 NOT REQUIRED

SELECTED TASKS/FREQUENCY DETEIMINATION

IDRNTIFTCATTON NO.

HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATAION

ITEM:

58-10-20

FAILURE CAUSE: 1C. AFT OUTRIGGER SEQUENCE VALVE STUCK OPEN
EFFECT CATEGORY
5(5) 7

8

9

o

o

0

O

o

0

o

0

o

o

*

*

0

0

0

0

o

*
0

0

*
o

o

0

it

ie

o

0

O

0

o

o

*

*

*

QUESTION

YES/NO

DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)

A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

No consumables to replenish.

B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.

C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.

D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

B. IS, CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE
FINDING TASK).

F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

o

* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO".

Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.

SELECTED
TASK

FREQUENCY :

None

None
REDESIGN: 1

Q MANDATORY

[~] DESIRABLE

0 NOT REQUIRED

SELECTED TASKS /FREQUENCY DETERMINATION

™:

HYDRAULICS - STARII I7ATTON

FAILURE CAUSE:
EFFECT CATEGORY

^

IDENTIFICATION NO.
58-10-20

n||TRTnRFR FXTFN q TnN RTNnTN p
QUESTION

YES /NO

DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)

5 & 789

o
o

o
0

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

O

o

o

*
o

o

o

*
o

0

*
o

o

0

0

o

o

*

o

*

it

if

*

*

0

A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

YES

Lubricate mechanical portion of outriggers.

B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

YES

Noisy or "chattering" extension of outrigger
will be obvious to operator.

B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE
FINDING TASK).
C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?
E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?
F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO".

Note: If answer to question is "YES" r describe; if "NO", state why.

SELECTED
TASK Lubricate mechanical portion of
outriggers .

FREQUENCY:
REDESIGN:

Every six months.
Q MANDATORY

Q DESIRABLE

0 ^^ KEQUJRED

SELECTED TASKS/FREQUENCY DETERMINATION

ITEM:

HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION

VERIFICATION NO.

FAILURE CAUSE: 1E . COUNTERBALANCE VALVE FAILED OPEN
EFFECT CATEGORY
5 &) 7

8

9

o

o

o

o

0

0

o

o

o

0
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o

o

*
o

o

*

*

o

o
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0
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0
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*
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0

58-10-20

QUESTION

YES/NO

A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

No consumables to replenish.

B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.

C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.

D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)

B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE
FINDING TASK).

F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO" .

Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.

SELECTED
TASK
None

FREQUENCY:
REDESIGN:

None
Q MANDATORY

Q DESIRABLE

g] NOT REQUIRED

FAILURE EFFECT CATEGORY
IDENTIFICATION NO.

ITEM: HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION

under all load conditions
FAILURE: Fails to maintain stable vehicle platform
& directions.
l injuries.
FAILURE EFFECT: Possible vehicle upset and personne

QUESTION NO. (Answer and explain)

FAILURE EFFECT CATEGORY

1-

IS OCCURRENCE OF FUNCTIONAL FAILURE EVIDENT TO
OPERATION PERSONNEL DURING NORMAL DUTIES OR TO
LAUNCH CONTROL VIA SYSTEM MONITORING?
NO

YES

DOES FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OR
SECONDARY DAMAGE RESULTING
FROM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
HAVE DIRECT ADVERSE EFFECT
ON OPERATING SAFETY?

58-10-20
FUNCTION: 2.
FAILURE: 2.

DOES COMBINATION OF A HIDDEN
FUNCTIONAL FAILURE AND ONE
ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF A
SYSTEM RELATED OR BACKUP
FUNCTION HAVE AN ADVERSE
EFFECT ON OPERATING SAFETY?

No - There are no hydraulic pressure
gauges or sensors in jack struts.
A loss of pressure in any strut
would not be known until it failed
to hold load.

2.f3) Yes - Loss of vehicle stability
in conjunction with a Stability
Warning System failure' could
result in vehicle upset and
personnel injuries.

NO

YES

4.

DOES FUNCTIONAL FAILURE
HAVE DIRECT ADVERSE
EFFECT ON OPERATING
CAPABILITY?
YES

CATEGORY: 8, Hidden Safety
EVIDENT
NON-OPERATIONAL
ECONOMIC

Form F3

Feb. 13/84

Prepared by:

Date:

SELECTED TASKS/FREQUENCY DETERMINATION

IDEOTIFICATION NO,

ITEM: HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION
2A.

FAILURE CAUSE:
EFFECT CATEGORY
5

6

7 (*T)

9

0

0

o

o

0

0

o

*

*

0

0

0

*

*

0

0

0

*

*

0

0

0

o

o

Form F4

DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)

QUESTION

YES/NO

A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

No consumables to replenish.

B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE
FINDING TASK) .

YES

A test to demonstrate unit can lift and hold the
Also, a visual
rated load would be effective.
inspection for external leaks during procedure.

C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR "OFF-UNIT
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

YES

Perform rated load test and visually inspect
for leaks .

B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?
o

o

0

0

0

0

0

0

*

*

*

o

"

* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO".
SELECTED
TASK

58-10-20

ONE OR MORE JACK CYLINDERS BYPASSING OR LEAKING

Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.

FREQUENCY: 1. Every six months
Pe rform "Stab. Test" in accord2. Once each use
arice with Calavar. Maint . Manual.
for
inspection
visual
-rform
2. Pe
Q DESIRABLE
Q MANDATORY
REDESIGN:
e*r ternal leak.
1.

Prepared by:

£) NOT REQUIRED

Date:

SELECTED TASKS /FREQUENCY DETERMINATION

ITEMj

- STABILIZATION

IDENTIFICATION NO.

2B. ONE OR MORE CHECK VALVES LEAKING
QUESTION

5

6

7

(?

9

0

0

0

0

0

o

0

o

*

*
o

0

0

*

*

0

0

o

r——
O

0

it

*

O

o

A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

58-10-20

YES/NO

DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)

NO

No consumables to replenish.

B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE
FINDING TASK).

YES

A test to demonstrate unit can lift and hold
rated load would be effective.

C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY ON-UNIT OR OFF-UNIT
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.

D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The item does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

YES

Perform rated load test.

B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

o

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

*

*

*

o

* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO".

Note: If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.

SELECTED Perform "Stab. Test" in accordance
TASK
with instructions in Calavar
Maintenance Manual.

FREQUENCY:
REDESIGN:

Every six months.
[] MANDATORY

[j DESIRABLE

0 NOT REQUIRED

SELECTED TASKS /FREQUENCY DETERMINATION

ITEM:

HYDRAULICS - STABILIZATION

IDENTIFICATION NO.

FAILURE CAUSE: 2 C. COUNTERBALANCE VALVE FAILS OPEN
EFFECT CATEGORY
5

6

7 (§]) 9

0

0

0

o

0

0

0

0

o

o

0

o

*
o
*

*

0

o

o

0

o

o

*
o

*
o

0

o

*

o

A. IS LUBRICATING OR SERVICE TASK
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

DESCRIBE/STATE WHY (see note)

NO

No consumables to replenish.

B. IS CHECK TO VERIFY OPERATION
APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE? (FAILURE
FINDING TASK).

YES

A test to demonstrate unit can lift and hold
rated load would be effective

*

C. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY ON^UNIT OR OFF-UNIT
TASK(S) APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

NO

Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable
nor is rate of resistance to failure predictable.

*

D. IS RESTORATION TASK TO REDUCE
FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

NO

The unit does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

*

E. IS DISCARD TASK TO AVOID FAILURES NO
OR REDUCE FAILURE RATE APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

The unit does not show functional degradation
characteristics at an identifiable age.

0

F. IS THERE A TASK OR COMBINATION
OF TASKS WHICH IS APPLICABLE AND
EFFECTIVE?

Perform rated load test.

* Use only if answer to previous question is "NO",
SELECTED
TASK

58-10-20

YES/NO

B. IS ABILITY TO DETECT DEGRADATION
OF FUNCTION BY OPERATING PERSONNEL
MONITORING APPLICABLE AND EFFECTIVE?

0

0

QUESTION

Perf<Drm "Stab, Test" in accordance
with instructions in Calavar
main"tenance manual.

YES

Notei If answer to question is "YES", describe; if "NO", state why.
FREQUENCY:
REDESIGN!

Every six months.
D MANDATORY

Q DESIRABLE

0 NOT REQUIRED

